Abstract
Introduction
Over the last decade, the interest in studying social capital has grown enormously among sociologists, political scientists and economists alike. While social capital is hardly a new concept, it has been greatly popularized by the seminal work of Robert Putnam (1993) . In his twenty-year long research on the quality of local governments in Italy, Putnam identified differences in civic participation (which he proxied, most notably, by membership in voluntary organizations) as the source of vast disparities in institutional quality and, in turn, economic performance between the North and South of Italy. A plethora of research has followed and social capital (which, as a general term, encompasses Putnam's civic participation) was found to have important real-life repercussions, in particular for economic, social and political development of societies. Macroeconomic studies (Knack and Keefer, 1997; Whiteley, 2000 and Beugelsdijk and van Schaik, 2005) have found that, in cross-country perspective, higher density of trust and/or active membership in organizations is associated with higher growth. Offering an historical perspective on the issue, Greif (1994) argues that the cultural underpinnings of social interactions in medieval societies played a crucial role in reducing free riding and opportunistic behavior. These empirical findings cement Coleman's (1988) assertion that social capital, just like other forms of capital, is productive and facilitates the attainment of goals that otherwise would not be possible. Accordingly, high stock of social capital increases individuals' ability and willingness to cooperate, improves monitoring and enforcement of contracts, and reduces free-riding and information asymmetry. Social capital therefore lowers transaction costs, fosters innovation and dissemination of technology and thus leads to better economic outcomes.
Despite the increasing recognition of the importance of social capital for economic outcomes, our understanding of factors that determine the stock of social capital -at the individual or aggregate levels -is still very limited. This is a major shortcoming, because "the dearth of research on determinants of social capital has held back its use as a policy tool in economic and social development" (Rupasingha et al., 2006: 84;  see also Glaeser, 2001) . The existing literature is concerned largely with measuring the stock of social capital (usually at the aggregate, national level) and its change over time and with investigating its impact on a particular variable of interest (typically economic and/or institutional development of countries). Little attention is given to analyzing the factors that determine the individual stock of social capital and/or to explaining the sources of cross-sectional differences across countries. 1 This paper therefore constitutes one of the few attempts to bridge the gap between theory and empirics. Its contribution is threefold. First, we introduce a new and previously unavailable comparative dataset, based on multiple Eurobarometer surveys featuring a number of alternative measures of social capital for a sample of 28
European countries -including the old member countries of the European Union and the new member countries. Second, we take the analysis of the determinants of individual stock of social capital to another level by considering individual and aggregate (country specific) factors alike. By using large multi-country data sets of individual respondents, our study permits the simultaneous identification of individual-level and societal-level determinants of social capital. Finally, by focusing on social capital in the enlarged EU, we aim to shed light on the existing gap in the stock of social capital between the developed Western countries and the former communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe. In particular, we investigate whether and why cross-sectional differences in social capital exist in Europe. In doing so, our analysis seeks to determine whether the East-West gap in social capital is due to different individual endowments such as education levels or occupational structure or country-specific economic and institutional characteristics.
As the data we are using were collected for the European Commission, our analysis is necessarily constrained to include only the old and new member countries of the EU. We construct measures of social capital applicable to both groups of countries and analyze them in a unified framework. We then discuss our findings specifically in the context of the enlargement process. Though there has been some research on social capital in post-communist countries 2 (see Paldam and Svendsen, 2000; Adam et al., 2004) , to the best of our knowledge, we are the first to 1 Furthermore, that work is largely theoretical in its nature (see Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000; Glaeser et al., 2002) . Empirical attempts, on the other hand, are fairly recent and tend to focus primarily on social capital in one country (see Glaeser et al., 2002 for evidence in the United States and Groot et al., 2007 for evidence in the Netherlands). For a recent extensive overview of social capital literature, see Durlauf and Fafchamps (2004) . 2 With the exception of Cyprus, Malta and Turkey, all new member countries are former communist countries. This shared legacy of communism and central planning is one of their main distinguishing features in comparison to the old member countries of the EU. Therefore, the on-going post-communist transition process is an important aspect of our analysis. systematically develop and jointly analyze the formation of social capital in both developed and transition countries. 3 In the previous literature on enlargement or, more generally, on the process of transition from communism to democracy and market economy, the focus has been on real and nominal convergence and on convergence in formal institutions (laws and regulations). Informal institutions such as social norms and rules of behavior have not received much attention. In this paper, we draw guidance from recent developments in the new institutional economics. That literature stresses the importance of informal institutions and their role in explaining differences across developed and less developed (both developing and transition) countries (see North, 1990; Feige, 1997) .
Given that the former communist countries are still going through transformation involving tremendous institutional restructuring, it is very important that informal institutions develop in parallel to formal institutions, so that the two remain compatible. If this happens, the transaction costs of such institutional restructuring, expressed in the form of predatory activities such as corruption and tax evasion, will decrease (see Pejovich, 2003) . On the other hand, if formal and informal institutions are in conflict with each other, more of such predatory activities may be expected, as shown empirically by Gërxhani (2004) .
Our analysis confirms the existence of a gap in social capital between Western and Eastern European countries. However, rather than being a permanent legacy of communism, our findings suggest that this gap reflects the lower level of economic development and the poorer quality of institutions in the latter countries. As such, it should gradually disappear as the post-communist countries catch up with respect to both their economic development and the quality of institutions.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the previous literature about social capital and its measurement; section 3 introduces our data and explains the measures that we use; section 4 presents the conceptual framework; section 5 provides empirical insights on the individual determinants of social capital; section 6 completes the analysis by integrating individual and aggregate factors; finally, section 7 provides conclusions.
3
A more recent contribution exploring only individual-level differences between Western and Eastern European countries, can be found in Kaasa and Parts (2007) .
Social capital: definitions and measurement issues

What is social capital?
As a consequence of the many aspects it is thought to embody, social capital has been defined in a variety of ways. Although the concept itself originates from Loury (1977) and later Bourdieu (1986 ), Coleman's (1988 definition has become especially popular. Coleman, presenting a sociologist's view, defines social capital as a component of human capital that allows members of a given society to trust one another and to cooperate in the formation of new groups and associations. Putnam (1993: 664-665) , a political scientist, offers a broader definition of social capital as encompassing "features of social life -networks, norms, and trust -that enable participants to act together more effectively to pursue shared interests. " Stiglitz (2000) , an economist, sees social capital -which he delineates as encompassing tacit knowledge, networks and reputation -as a social means to tackle moral hazard and incentive issues. Broadly speaking, all these definitions refer to trust, cooperative behavior and networks between groups as essential components of social capital (Knack and Keefer, 1997) . In the presence of trust, cooperation is easier and therefore the frequency and density of networks is expected to be higher. 4 Interaction through networks in turn enhances trust and cooperative ability. According to Dasgupta (1988) , social capital can make economic transactions more efficient by expanding the parties' access to information, enabling them to coordinate activities for mutual benefit and reducing opportunistic behavior through repeated transactions. In addition, Putnam (1993) argues that participation in civic associations can contribute to the effectiveness and stability of democratic governments, both because of their internal effects on individual members and because of their external effects on the wider polity. "Internally, associations instill in their members habits of cooperation, solidarity and public-spiritedness. Externally, 'interest articulation' and 'interest aggregation' are enhanced by a dense network of secondary associations" (Putnam, 1993: 89-90 ). All-in-all, these studies are fundamentally based on the assumption that 4
The direction of causality is not clearly resolved, however. Gambetta (1990) , for example, argues that trust follows rather than causes cooperation. social capital is one of the primary forces that shape social and economic development.
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There is, however, theoretical (see Lipset, 1959; Flanagan, 1987; Inglehart, 1997) and empirical (see Inglehart and Baker, 2000; Paugam and Russell, 2000; O'Connell, 2003; Casey and Christ, 2005) research that either questions the validity of this assumption or substantiates the opposite direction of causality. In other words, these studies argue that social capital may mediate economic development but not determine it, or that social capital is in fact determined by economic outcomes.
Focusing particularly on one aspect of social capital -civic involvement in associations -sociologists and political scientists have found that the higher the GDP per capita, the higher the level of education and as a consequence wealth, and therefore the easier the shift toward the 'post-materialist' values of well-being, tolerance and trust -values which in turn support the development of associations (see Inglehart, 1990; . The relationship between social capital measured as membership in organizations and democracy has also been researched. Discussions, mainly theoretical, on this relationship are also split around the issue of causality. In a recent empirical study, however, Paxton (2002) finds that the relationship between social capital and democracy is reciprocal so that they simultaneously affect each other.
Obviously, whether social capital affects social, political and economic development or the other way around, or whether the relationship is simultaneous, remains a controversial issue. Because of the popularity of the concept emerging from the focus on the effect of social capital on societal development, in spite of some studies mentioned above, the reverse effect is under-researched. In order to understand better the development of nations, more research is needed on the determinants of social capital. Agreeing with social psychologists, Greif (1994) argues that the level of development and the organization of an economy may determine whether societies develop 'collectivist' or 'individualist' characteristics.
The former tend to build up group-specific social capital -pertaining to one's family, religious or ethnic group -and rely on informal enforcement, whereas the latter are 5 Nevertheless, it is now widely recognized that social capital may also have less desirable consequences. For an extensive discussion, see Portes (1998). based on interactions across groups that facilitate the accumulation of generalized social capital and make use of formal enforcement rules. 6 An analogy can be observed between Greif's categorization of societies and the two groups of countries analyzed in this paper. Most of the old member states of the EU are generally characterized by a high density of economic transactions among groups, well-established institutions, high level of generalized trust, high participation in civil associations and a bottom-up structure of economic transactions. Correspondingly, they would seem to fall into the category of individualist societies.
New member countries, on the other hand, feature relatively large underground economy, greater corruption and state failure, low levels of generalized trust and participation in civil associations and a top-down structure of economic transactions.
Hence, they come close to Greif's description of collectivist societies. Moreover, with the exception of Cyprus and Malta as well as Turkey, which is still only a candidate for EU membership, the new member countries share the legacy of communism.
Research on social capital in these countries has put forward a so-called dictatorship theory of missing social capital (see Raiser, 1999; Kunioka and Woller, 1999; and Svedsen, 2000, 2001) . According to this theory, dictatorships destroy social capital, group-specific and generalized alike. Furthermore, they create conditions whereby, when dictatorships collapse, societies may even accumulate 'negative' social capital, which in turn impedes economic growth. During the transition period in most of the new member countries, 'positive' social capital has seemingly dissipated and 'negative' social capital, taking the form of underground activities, corruption and organized crime, has become more prominent. The extent to which this 'negative' social capital (i.e., underground activities or corruption) has emerged varies per country. Rose (2000) relates it to the supremacy of the totalitarian regime these countries experienced during communism. The same line of argument can be found in Putnam et al. (1993) , where the low level of social capital in South Italy is attributed to the long absolutist regime of the Kingdom of Sicily. communism may possess neither generalized nor group-specific social capital and may even have an inherited stock of 'negative' social capital. 8 These characteristics of post-communist countries provide another evidence of the causation running from democracy to social capital. Tong (1994: 334) observes:
"Given the totalitarian tendencies of state socialist systems, an autonomous civil society rarely emerges in a bottom-up fashion, except when the regime is in serious crisis. Instead, its emergence is often the result of top-down efforts, that is, through tolerance, encouragement, or sponsorship by state policies."
Measurement of social capital
The literature tends to attach the label social capital quite liberally to a number of concepts that are not necessarily equivalent to each other, causing definitional ambiguity (Portes, 1998) . According to Durlauf (2002) , the literature provides a mixture of 'functional and causal conceptions of social capital'. The former refer to social capital as being functional in facilitating cooperation and efficiency while the latter refer to social capital as a social asset that causes individual cooperative behavior. Durlauf emphasizes the importance of causal definitions of social capital for successful empirical analysis.
9
The following are the most popular empirical measures of generalized social capital:
1
Civic participation, or membership in voluntary organizations, was pioneered by Putnam's (1993) seminal work on Italian regions. Through membership in voluntary organizations, one learns to interact with other people -both acquaintances and strangers -in a cooperative manner and to solicit their cooperation to achieve a shared objective. 10 As such, voluntary organizations introduce their members to advantages and practice of collective action (Olson, 1982) . Later work distinguishes further between Putnamesque and Olsonian 8 Leitzel (1997) , however, provides an interesting insight on this issue by highlighting some positive effects of 'negative' social capital. He argues that collective breaking of 'bad' rules such as excessive regulation of the emerging private sector may in fact have positive consequences as it eventually forces the authorities to abandon such bad rules and replace them with better ones.
9
For a broader review of empirical analysis of social capital, see Durlauf (2002) . 10 For instance, participating in team sports or playing an instrument in an orchestra requires an extraordinary degree of cooperation, coordination and discipline. The fans of The Simpsons television series may recall Lisa Simpson's unsuccessful attempt at individualism when playing the saxophone in a school orchestra, which illustrates this point rather well.
organizations (Knack and Keefer, 1997) . The former, such as educational, sport and art clubs, religious and charitable organizations and youth groups, allow their members to build up social capital and to pursue common goals without imposing negative externalities on the rest of the society. The latter, including political parties and movements, trade unions, professional associations, and various interest groups, tend to engage in collective action that reconfigures redistribution systems in their favor at the expense of the rest of the society. Therefore, in contrast to Putnamesque groups, which are thought to play a positive role in the society, the impact of Olsonian groups may be negative. Trust, popularized by Fukuyama (1995) , has become the most commonly used (Bourdieu, 1986: 248) . The relevance of this definition lies, first, in its focus on the social relationship itself and, second, in the emphasis related to the benefits associated with participation in such a relationship. As summarized by Portes (1998: 6) , it is exactly "the ability of actors to secure benefits by virtue of membership in social networks or other social structures" that this paper looks at.
The following section provides a description of the data and methodology used, and explains how social capital is operationalized in this paper. Kingdom (additional 300 respondents in Northern Ireland), Poland and Turkey (2,000 respondents each), and Cyprus, Luxembourg and Malta (500 respondents each). The overall sample size thus is approximately 16,000 for the EB surveys and 14,000 for the CCEB. The same questionnaire is used in all countries of the respective group (EB or CCEB), the questionnaire is translated and interviewers are local staff. The surveys are constructed so as to be broadly representative at the national level. The data report East Germany and Northern Ireland as separate entities, and we maintain this distinction. See WZB (2003) for more details. 16 For a detailed discussion, see Paxton (1999) . 17 An implication of this formulation is that being a member of a religion and attending religious services is not regarded as social capital, unless one actively participates in religious or parish disregarding multiple memberships in similar organizations (e.g., one may be a member of two or more sports clubs The last two columns of the second part of the table report on the respondents' altruistic behavior, based on the following two questions: "Now thinking about poor organizations. Applying a more liberal concept would result in artificially high levels of social capital for countries with high identification with a dominant religion (e.g., the Roman-Catholic church in Poland or Italy). 18 Some argue that generalized trust is not an adequate measure of social capital, because it does not differentiate between trust and trustworthiness (see Bornhorst et al., 2004) , and because it is contextdependent. For example, in an ethnically polarized society, a member of the minority group -even if perfectly trustworthy-will often neither be trusted by the majority of population nor him(her)self trust the members of the majority (see Fershtman and Gneezy, 2001 ). In addition, the same individual would report considerably different generalized trust depending on the wording (or understanding) of the question: he or she would report high trust vis-à-vis members of own group but low trust vis-à-vis members of the majority group. Glaeser et al. (2000) provide a fine combination of experimental and field data to measure both concepts of trust and trustworthiness. For an interesting theoretical study of trustworthiness, as corresponding to a non-incentive based type of social capital, see Francois and Zabojnik (2005 Given that the vast majority of the new EU members are post-communist countries, this observation seems to confirm the assertion of Svendsen (2000, 2001) and Adam et al. (2004) that communism destroyed social capital by discouraging social interactions outside one's immediate network of friends and family. Second, there is nonetheless a considerable degree of variation within both groups of countries -some new member countries display high endowments of social capital whereas some old member countries fare rather poorly. A detailed analysis shedding light on these differences is provided in the following sections.
Social capital in Europe
Conceptual framework
As suggested by Bourdieu (1986) , we view social capital as a productive asset that is built up through investment in social relationships: it takes time, effort and often financial outlays to accumulate. Once built up, as with other types of capital (physical and human), social capital generates a return, depreciates over time and needs to be kept up to prevent it from dissipating and becoming obsolete. An individual's investment in social capital therefore should depend on the individual's socioeconomic characteristics, in particular age, family background, level of human capital (education and occupation) and income (see Coleman, 1988) . While our approach in this paper is purely empirical, this notion of social capital can be supported by standard economic theory, as is done by Glaeser et al. (2002) who model individual stock of social capital as the outcome of an individual maximization problem with limited resources. Furthermore, in line with our discussion in section 2, we also consider aggregate determinants of social capital such as the level of economic development and quality of institutions. The former -e.g. the level and distribution of income -may help create more cohesive societies and hence encourage the formation of social capital (Inglehart, 1990; Wilkinson, 1996) . The latter -e.g. the rule of law, institutional transparency and stability and continuity of democracy -are likely to affect the return to investment in any type of capital, including the social one. In more transparent and less corrupt societies, individuals are more willing to engage in civic activities (O'Connell, 2003) . According to Paldam (2002) , corruption is by far the best available measure of 'negative' social capital. Democracy is also an important factor influencing not only civic engagement but also voluntary membership in associations (Curtis et al., 2001; Schofer and Fourcade-Gourinchas, 2001 ). In other words, individuals in countries with less transparent and less democratic institutions may be discouraged from investing and, in turn, will acquire less generalized social capital than their counterparts in countries with better institutional environment.
In this paper, we are interested in identifying the determinants of the stock of social capital. Formally, denoting social capital as y i *, we would like to estimate the following model:
where x i is a vector of individual socio-economic characteristics, z i is a vector of aggregate country-level determinants and ε i is an unobserved error term.
However, we do not observe social capital directly. Instead, we observe individual membership in voluntary organizations and social networks, which we believe to be manifestations of an individual's stock of social capital. As very few individuals participate in more than three organizations, we recoded civic participation so that it takes values 0, 1, 2, or 3, with 3 denoting anyone who participates in three or more organizations. The participation in Putnamesque and
Olsonian groups was recoded in the same way. Social networks remain defined as above: zero-one dummy variables indicates access to the respective network. The where µ 1 , µ 2 and µ 3 are unknown parameters corresponding to threshold levels of social capital at which individuals increase their civic participation. Assuming the error term has a logistic distribution, the ordered logit model estimates the probabilities of an observation falling within each category as a function of the individual and aggregate characteristics, x i and z i respectively. 19 An important advantage of the ordered logit model is that, unlike linear regression, it does not stipulate that, for example, an individual participating in two voluntary organizations has twice as large stock of social capital as an individual participating in only one organization. The binomial logit, which we use for our analysis of social networks, is a special case of the above with y taking values 0 and 1 only and with only one threshold parameter, µ 1 . For both models, obtaining a positive coefficient estimate implies that the variable in question increases the probability of having a higher stock of social capital.
Endogeneity issues
A valid empirical concern is that income -and possibly other right-hand side variables -may be endogenous in social capital. As income is contemporaneous with social capital, unlike education which is typically acquired at a relatively young age, positive correlation may reflect the fact that social capital helps individuals achieve higher earnings. The appropriate approach in this case would be to use suitable instruments for income. We would require individual characteristics that can explain income without being correlated with social capital directly. Finding good instruments is notoriously hard, however, especially when, as in our case, the number of variables to choose from is limited and the data pools four different surveys which did not always include the same questions. Alternatively, we could identify the relationship between social capital and income if we could identify exogenous variation in income that cannot be attributed to changes in social capital. This approach would be virtually impossible in a single cross-section and would instead require a panel-data analysis.
In addition, the objective of our paper is to explain the gap in social capital between new and old member countries of the EU -and, more generally, between less developed and developed countries -rather than to resolve the question of endogeneity of social capital with respect to income. The endogeneity bias, if present, would tend to inflate our coefficients for the impact of income on social capital and therefore the coefficients that we obtain present the upper bound of this effect.
Because of our concerns about possible endogeneity of income in social capital,
we re-estimated all of our regressions while omitting the income variable.
Importantly, the coefficients estimated for the other variables remain essentially the same regardless of whether income is included or not. 20 Hence, even if the coefficient for income is biased upwards, this should not affect our conclusions on the sources of the East-West gap in social capital.
An implication of the potential endogeneity of income (and perhaps of some of the other variables) is that our regression results cannot be interpreted as necessarily identifying causality. Rather, they are indicative of conditional correlation only and any associated discussion of causal relations is to a large extent speculative.
Another type of endogeneity is likely in aggregate-level studies: social capital may determine economic outcomes such as economic growth or the level of economic development (see Durlauf, 2002) . Importantly, this does not apply to our analysis because we work with individual stocks of social capital. While economic outcomes are likely to be endogenous in aggregate (country-level) social capital, each individual respondent is too small for her social capital to have an impact on the aggregate economic outcomes.
Individual determinants of social capital
As a first step, we relate the individual stock of social capital to only individual sociodemographic characteristics: gender, age, marital status, education, occupation, residency in urban vs. rural areas and income. Formally, this implies estimating a reduced form of equation (1):
This allows us to ascertain whether the gap in social capital levels between old and new member countries is due to differences in socio-economic and demographic individual-level characteristics (or endowments). For instance, new and old member countries could have different average stocks of social capital because their populations have different distributions of age, education or occupations. However, the descriptive statistics summarized in Table 3 suggest that this is unlikely to be the case. Except for having somewhat higher shares of unemployment and retired workers, the new member states are remarkably similar to the old ones. Furthermore, the country that stands out the most is Turkey, which has a younger population, larger households a higher share of the population being unemployed, out of labor force or 20 The results obtained without income can be provided upon request.
in farming, fewer retirees and fewer people with post-primary education than either the new or old member states. While Turkey is included in the summary statistics in Tables 1-3 , we do not include it in our empirical analysis below.
TABLE 3 HERE
Based on previous research, we should expect social capital to be higher among older people (Putnam, 1995) or to follow a life-cycle pattern (Glaeser et al., 2000) ; married individuals to have a slightly higher stock of social capital (Putnam, 1995) ; education to be positively correlated with social capital (Helliwell and Putnam, 1999; Glaeser et al., 2002) ; entrepreneurship (self-employment) to contribute to a higher stock of social capital (Svendsen and Svendsen, 2004) ; residency in urban areas to decrease social capital; and income to be positively correlated with investment in social capital (Rupasingha et al., 2006) . To account for country-specific factors, we also include country dummies. However, East Germany and Northern Ireland are reported as separate entities in the EB data sets and we maintain this distinction because of the potentially special nature of these two regions.
The dependent variables are two of the measures introduced in section 3: civic participation and social networks. 22 Table 4 reports the regression results obtained with civic participation for the new member countries, while 23 Note that the pseudo r-squared that we report alongside our regression results is the McFadden's rsquared. Limited-dependent variable models such as binomial and ordered logit are non-linear and therefore do not have an equivalent of the r-squared statistic computed for OLS models and their interpretation is somewhat different. While this measure is bound to lie within the [0, 1] interval and increases with the quality of the model, it is typically lower than the r-squared estimated for a comparable linear regression model. 24 Specifically, our regression result effectively implies that social capital is a quadratic function of age and this age range is where this function reaches its peak. Although a different peak point is obtained for each regression, they all fall within the 50-60 years range.
Olsonian ones. The self-employed and white-collar workers, finally, tend to participate more often in Putnamesque rather than in Olsonian groups.
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The positive relationship between education and the stock of social capital suggests complementarity between social and human capital: individuals who acquire a high stock of one also invest in the other (Coleman, 1988 , also makes this point).
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In addition, education may reduce the cost of investing in social capital by improving one's communication skills, increasing social interaction and networking or by generating positive externalities (Helliwell and Putnam, 1999; Rupasingha et al., 2006) . The positive effect of income confirms the existing empirical findings but contradicts the theoretical predictions that investment in social capital should fall with opportunity cost of time embodied in earnings (Glaeser et al., 2002) . A possible explanation for this finding is that obtaining social capital requires both time and monetary outlays.
Finally, the individual determinants of social capital appear similar in old and new member countries of the EU. Given that, as demonstrated in Table 3 , old and new member countries have generally comparable socio-economic structure and that the impact of the various individual characteristics on social capital seems similar, we expect country-specific factors to play an important role in accounting for the EastWest gap. This is already insinuated by the high and significant country dummies in tables 4-7. In the next section, we therefore consider aggregate determinants of social capital.
Economic development and institutional quality
In this section, we extend the analysis of determinants of social capital by considering, alongside individual characteristics, aggregate factors such as economic development and the quality of institutions. We thus estimate the full version of equation (1), with the aggregate variables captured by vector z i . In doing so, we hope to gain additional insights into the factors that underlie the formation of social capital at the individual level and explain the gap in the level of social capital between old and new EU member countries.
As we want to determine whether old and new member countries of the EU have significantly different social capital levels, we merge the two groups of countries of the EU and include a dummy variable for the new members -while dropping the country dummies. Obtaining a significant coefficient on the 'new members' dummy would indicate that there is indeed a gap between the old and the new members that cannot be explained by the variables included in the regression.
At first, we run the regressions only with individual characteristics, thereby merely replicating the above-reported results using the merged data set. These results are reported in Table 8 , again for civic participation -overall active participation in voluntary organization as well as participation in Putnamesque and Olsonian groups separately -and for access to social networks. The impact of individual characteristics mirrors our previous findings: age, education, income, occupation and employment status are all important determinants of the individual stock of social capital. Note, however, that in this merged data set the self-employed now display significantly lower civic participation whereas before the self-employed dummy appeared with positive coefficient for the new member countries and an insignificant or marginally significant negative coefficient for the old member countries.
The results of the first regression, with overall civic participation, confirm the observation based on country averages as reported in Table 1 that the new members lag significantly behind the old member countries in their stock of social capital: the coefficient on the new members dummy is negative and strongly significant. When distinguishing between Putnamesque and Olsonian groups, an interesting result appears: the new member countries do better than old member countries with respect to participation in Putnamesque groups but do worse for Olsonian groups. The coefficient estimate, however, is much lower -in absolute value -for the former than for the latter. Hence, when the two types of groups are pooled together in 'overall civic participation', the lower participation in Olsonian groups more than offsets the effect of higher participation in Putnamesque ones and the new member countries thus appear to lag behind the old member countries. This result is particularly interesting because it cannot be readily discerned from the country averages in Table 1 . In that table, new member countries appear with lower participation in both Olsonian and Putnamesque groups; it is only after accounting for individual characteristics that this striking difference becomes apparent.
As we will see later when accounting for institutional factors, the finding that the new member countries lag behind especially with respect to participation in Olsonian groups reflects a general dissatisfaction with, and lack of trust in, formal institutions in the new member countries. This dissatisfaction is particularly strong with respect to groups such as political parties and unions. This has its roots in communismcommon to all new member countries except Cyprus and Malta -when political activity was not voluntary, trade unions were highly politicized and subordinated to the communist party and civil society emerged in a bottom-up fashion (Tong, 1994) .
The gap in social capital also appears when considering access to social networks:
across all three sub-measures, the new members appear to lag significantly behind the old member countries of the EU. The results are striking: once the economic development and institutional quality are controlled for, the new member countries no longer seem to be different from the old members with respect to their stock of social capital. Recall that in the regressions reported in Table 8 , the new-member dummy appeared always with a negative and significant coefficient with the exception of participation in Putnamesque groups.
Once we control for country-specific characteristics, however, the dummy appears The impact of country-specific economic and institutional conditions is in line with previous research. Higher per-capita income levels tend to be associated with more frequent civic participation. The relationship is, however, not very robust and when additional aggregate indicators are included in the regression it often appears insignificant (as it is the case in the regressions reported in Table 9 ). Interestingly enough, individuals in richer countries have poorer access to social networks when in need of money, possibly because of the presence of more advanced financial systems in those countries (individual in richer countries are likely to have an easier time to 28 Note that we adjusted the standard errors for the fact that aggregate and individual variables are measured at different levels of aggregation.
obtain a bank loan and therefore would have less need to rely on their acquaintances in case of hardship). Individuals in countries with high income inequality and especially in those with rampant corruption tend to acquire less social capital.
Economic freedom seems to encourage investment in social capital.
These patterns are very intuitive. Income inequality reflects the intensity of social conflict and polarization in a country (see Knack and Keefer, 1997; Rodrik, 1999; Rupasingha et al., 2006 Although convergence in formal institutions between the old and the new member states has to a large extent been accomplished (largely as a prerequisite of their accession to the EU), there remains a mismatch between these 'harmonized' formal institutions and the existing informal institutions in the new member countries (see Pejovich, 2003 , for a broader discussion). This lack of correspondence, embodied in the prevalence of corruption and other predatory activities, may be the underlying reason for the gap in social capital. This argument can be reinforced by our finding that the participation in Olsonian groups (formal political groups and parties or unions) is much lower than in Putnamesque groups in the new member countries, reflecting the individuals' lack of trust in formal institutions. In this respect, we agree with previous research that argues that social capital (as measured by voluntary participation in organizations) is not merely dependent on individuals' wealth, education or particular interests but also on the cultural and institutional arrangements defined at the national level (Schofer and Fourcade-Gourinchas, 2001 ).
The enlargement of the European Union is expected to foster institutional development and encourage adoption of growth-enhancing economic policies in the new member countries. This will, in turn, discourage rent-seeking, motivate a rewarding scheme of leadership based on performance, enhance public trust in the state's actions and promote civic spirit. All this should reduce the return to 'negative' 29 Note that, as we argue in section 4, aggregate-level economic development (measured by GDP per capita) cannot be endogenous in individual-level social capital because each individual's effect on aggregate outcomes is infinitesimally small. Had we regressed aggregate social capital on economic development, similar conclusion would stand on much shakier foundations. The conclusion, however, is open to possible criticism that both social capital and economic development are driven by some third factor which we failed to identify by our analysis.
social capital and encourage the formation of 'positive' social capital. Thus, once
Central and Eastern European countries catch up with the West in terms of economic development and institutions, they are very likely to close the gap in social capital as well. For this to be possible, however, a gradual harmonization of formal rules and informal norms between the two groups of countries should be of primary importance.
Wilkinson, R.G. (1996) . 
Notes:
Average participation is the average number of voluntary organizations in which respondents actively participate. Putnam groups are charities, religious organizations, cultural or artistic organizations, youth organizations, sports clubs and associations, hobby clubs, and other clubs or organizations. Olsonian groups are trade unions or political parties, human rights movements or organizations, organizations for the protections of nature, animals and the environment, and consumer organizations. The maximum possible value is 11 for average participation, 7 for Putnam groups and 4 for Olson groups. Network variables take the value of 1 if the respondents feel she has someone (besides the members of her immediate household) to rely on when feeling depressed, in need of a new job for herself or a family member, or to borrow money urgently, and 0 otherwise. Altruism variables measure whether the respondent contributed money or gave up some of her time during the preceding 12 months to help poor or socially excluded people. It takes values of 0 (never), 1 (less than once a month) and 2 (more than once a month). EU-OM and EU-NM stand for average values for old and new member countries of the EU, respectively. These variables are based on the following surveys: EB50.1 (1998) for civic participation, EB56.1 (2001) for networks, EB52.1 (1999) for altruism, and CCEB 2002.1 for all three types of variables for the new member countries. See the text for further details and the precise wording of the relevant questions. We are grateful to the Gallup Organisation Europe for kindly making these data available to us. Trust is based on the World Value Surveys rounds of 1990 and 1996-97. The numbers correspond to the fraction of the respondents who declare that most people can be trusted. Blank cell indicates that the country did not participate in that survey round and therefore no data are available. 
